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A B S T R A C T
The pollution of the Mediterranean environment is a 
problem common to almost a l l  of the bodies of 
water on the surface of the earth. What sets the 
pollution in the Mediterranean Sea apart from any 
others is that intensive international e f fo r ts  at 
overcoming i t  have been underway for decades now 
and w i th  considerable success. The Mediterranean 
Action Plan is the f i r s t  example of an extensive 
regional e f fo r t  at overcoming marine pol lut ion. 
Although i t  has not been able to reverse the 
damage done to the Mediterranean Sea, i t  has 
nevertheless given r ise  to a consciousness of 
po l lu t ion  and the need fo r  contro l l ing  i t  and 
consequently has saved the Mediterranean from a 
doomsday scenario which would otherwise have 
been await ing it. Moreover, i t  is important in that i t  
managed to bring all of the Mediterranean l i t to ra l  
countries to the negotiations table despite the ir  
differences, though they were many. In this respect, 
the success achieved in the Mediterranean Action 
Plan can be base to in ternat iona l environmental 
cooperation in other environmental issues.
Ö Z ET
Deniz kir lenmesi aşağı yukarı dünya yüzeyindeki 
tüm su kü t le le r in in  ortak sorunudur. Akdenizdeki 
k ir lenmeyi d iğerlerinden fa rk l ı  kılan bu sorunu 
aşmak için y ı l la rd ı r  sürdürülen ve oldukça başarılı 
sayılabilecek olan yoğun u luslararası çabalardır. 
Akdeniz Eylem Planı deniz k i r l i l i ğ i n i  ortadan 
kaldırmak iç in  düzenlenen çok yönlü bölgesel 
çalışmaların i lk  örneğidir. Akdeniz Eylem Planı her 
ne kadar var olan k i r l i l i ğ i  ortadan kaldıramadıysa 
da, k i r l i l i k  b i l inc in i  ve onu temizleme gereğini 
bel leklere ye r leş t i rm iş  ve bu sayede de Akdeniz 
iç in yazılmış olan kıyamet senaryolarını geçersiz 
k ı lm ış t ı r .  Bundan öte, Akdeniz Eylem Planı kıyı 
ü lkeler in in tümünü pek çok fa rk l ı l ık la r ına  rağmen 
anlaşma masasına getirebi lmiş olması dolayısıyla da 
önemlidir. Bu anlamda, Akdeniz Eylem Planında elde 
e d i lm iş  olan başarı, d iğer  u lus lararası çevre 
sorunlarında uluslararası çevre işb i r l iğ in e  örnek 
oluşturabil ir.
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CHAPTER I; INTRODUCTION
Environmental problems are taking on a more 
and more global character is t ic  with each passing 
day. Pollutants of all types are transboundary and 
thus affect many countries rather than just one. 
Countries have become ecologically 
interdependent due to the transboundary nature of 
pollutants.
The Mediterranean basin which lies at the 
crossroads of the world (between three continents 
and two oceans) has been cradle to many a 
c iv i l iza t ion throughout h istory. The etymology of 
its name gives us a good clue as to the nature of 
the sea. From Latin médius and terra, the word 
Mediterranean means “ surrounded by land.” In fact, 
the word “Méditerranée” means “ center of the 
world." '
The Mediterranean has for many centuries 
given man his bread. It is one of the most beautiful 
seas of the world, one of phenomenal richness and 
varie ty. But mankind has been very ungrateful in 
return and has not, unti l recent ly ,  stopped to think 
about the health of the sea which provides for him. 
He has appallingly abused the sea. His ac t iv i t ies  
both in the sea and on land have been threateningly 
burdensome on the Mediterranean.
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The Mediterranean has long been polluted, but 
it was not unti l the Increased tanker t ra f f ic  o f  the 
early 20th century that pol lu t ion became vis ible to 
the naked eye. Then suddenly conservationists, 
sc ientis ts and journalists alike began to talk o f the 
‘death’ of the Mediterranean. Xavier Pastor 
summarizes the situation at the time as follows; 
“ there seemed l i t t le  doubt that, if no solutions 
were found to the growing assault on the 
Mediterranean environment, then the fate of the 
sea would be sealed fo reve r . ”^
Indeed the Mediterranean was wounded by the 
part icularly intense and harmful pollut ion on its 
shores. Moreover, although there is a v i r tua l  lack 
of currents in the Mediterranean, pol lutants did 
traverse from one country to the next, a lbe it  
slowly. Thus, coordinated regional action was 
needed for its recovery.
The f i r s t  United Nations Conference on the 
environment was held at Stockholm in 1972. This 
conference was the f i r s t  international legal step 
taken regarding environmental problems. The 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was 
established at this conference.
Not very soon a f te r  the realization of 
pollution the Mediterranean states, knowing fully 
well that solutions required regional cooperation 
and realizing that their  l imited attempts at 
pollut ion control were not enough, called on UNEP 
to take over regional contro l e f fo r ts .
UNEP responded by establishing the
Mediterranean Action Plan in 1975. The Med Plan, as 
it is known for short, is a series of legally binding 
agreements to bring various kinds of pollut ion 
under control and to improve w i ld l i fe  protection.
Med Plan represents an example of a 
collect ive e f fo r t  to coordinate the control 
practices of all eighteen Mediterranean l i t to ra l  
countries. And as it is a re la t ive ly  successful 
example of international cooperation, i t  has been 
chosen as a case study to be analyzed in this 
thesis. Indeed, the setting of the Mediterranean is 
one where extensive cooperation might be least 
expected to occur. As Peter Haas indicates, 
“ environmental cooperation, as in other 
international issues, means that d i f ferent part ies 
accommodate their  actions in accord with the 
desires o f the ir  partners.”  ^ And, needless to say, 
these 'des ires ’ vary. Both po l i t ica l  and economic 
controversies stand in the way of cooperation. 
When cooperating in pol lu t ion control, states
disagree on the level of quality desired, the scope 
of pollutants to control and many other issues. 
Moreover, the Mediterranean region is beset by 
deep po l i t ica l animosit ies, one very famil iar 
example being that of the h is tor ica l Turco-Greek 
enmity. .
Yet, remarkably enough, the Med Plan has 
succeeded in bringing all of the Mediterranean 
countries to the same table to discuss the 
protect ion of the sea that they all share. The Med 
Plan is thus considered to be a re la t ive ly  
successful case of international cooperation. All 
the same, however, th is plan also has i ts  
shortcomings and there are many obstacles that 
stand in the way to full cooperation. The purpose of 
this study is to make a cr i t ica l  analysis of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan with a v iew to 
understanding the elements of success as well as 
the deficiencies of the plan. The ult imate objective 
of the thesis is to evaluate the a ttempts to 
overcome obstacles to international cooperation 
and the prospects of applying the same procedures 
to other cases of environmental problems.
In this respect, chapter II will  lay out a 
theoretical framework for the thesis. It w i l l  b r ie f ly  
present three d i f fe ren t  theories of cooperation: 
neorealism, h is tor ica l materia l ism, and the
epistemic community model and decide which of 
the three best explains cooperation in the 
Med iterranean.
Chapter 111 will  f i r s t l y  look into the 
development of international concern about
environmental pollution. A description of pollut ion 
in the Mediterranean, and i ts  effects, the rise of 
international consciousness towards the problem 
and international e f fo rts  to control the problem 
will be provided within this chapter. The 
establishment of the Med iterranean Action Plan, its 
major regional treaties, as well as the coordinated 
research and monitoring, integrated planning 
components and financial aspects of the plan wil l  
also be looked into in this chapter.
The final chapter of the thesis will look into 
some of the obstacles which bar the fu l l  
implementation of agreements. It will  also study 
what has been done within the framework of the 
Med Plan to overcome these problems, and whether 
or not the Med Plan can set an example to further 
international cooperation.
As a whole then, th is study will  try to 
demonstrate that international cooperation is not a 
dream over the rainbow, and that i t  is indeed 
passible despite problems. A f te r  all, i f  the
Mediterranean countries which are so alike, yet so 
different, can come together to look for solutions, 
why can’t others?
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CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL
COOPERATION THEORIES
FRAMEWORK:
As pollut ion in the Mediterranean is of a 
transboundary nature, overcoming it requires 
collect ive action and this can only be maintained 
through cooperation. “ Environmental cooperation, 
as in other international issues, means that 
d if ferent parties accommodate their  actions in 
accord with the desires of the ir  partners,” ’
Robert Keohane writes that intergovernmental 
cooperation takes place when "the policies actually 
followed by one government are regarded by its 
partners as fac i l i ta t ing real izat ion of their  own 
objectives, as the result of a process of policy 
coo rd inat ion. ”2
Different schools o f thought o ffe r  
contradictory in terpre ta t ions of the conditions 
under which cooperation in the Mediterranean is 
l ikely to occur, and i ts form. This study will  look 
into three alternative views of cooperation: 
neorealism, h is tor ica l materia l ism, and the 
approach of epistemic communities.
Neorealism is concerned with the relat ion 
between state power and order, generally in the 
area of security affairs and the po l i t ica l  economy 
of the advanced Industr ialized societies.
Historical materia l ism is concerned with 
international equity and the d is t r ibut ion  of 
economic resources, often in North-South 
relations.
The approach of ep is temic communities is 
concerned with knowledge-based communities and 
the interpretat ion of uncertainty. This approach 
involves groups of special ists that are responsible 
for art iculating polic ies and iden-tlfylng the 
national interest.^
The neorealism school of thought accepts 
anarchy to be the prevail ing international condit ion 
that affects the state foreign policy decision 
making process. This condition is characterized by 
Kenneth Waltz as being a system of “ se l f -he lp .”"’ 
Under these conditions, the fundamental problem of 
world po l i t ics  is accepted as being the 
“ uncertainty of reciprocation."s This uncertainty 
increases as do the number o f partners, as a result 
of the d i f f icu l ty  of monitoring compliance. 
Neorealists assume that countries are inhibited 
from cooperating out of fear that possible partners
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may not reciprocate and that this leads to a 
general unwill ingness to commit to co l lect ive 
action for fear of being taken for a ‘patsy. ’
The notion that sta tes are doomed to perish 
unless they act to p ro tec t  their  own autonomy is 
also a neorealist assumption. Neorealists claim 
that this is the idea that l ies behind competit ive 
behavior in collective action. Nevertheless, even 
neorealists, who generally speaking are very much 
pessimist ic about international cooperation grant 
that in areas in which survival is not at risk such as 
environmental relations, cooperation is more l ikely 
to occur because “ the costs of unreciprocated 
concessions are less as state survival is less at 
stake.”6 All the same, however, neorealists 
maintain that it is l ikely that states will a t tempt 
to preserve their  autonomy over policy choices, so 
as to reduce their  vu lnerabi l i ty  to decisions made 
elsewhere. Kenneth Waltz maintains that “ state 
attachment to autonomy will  never permit serious 
incursions on that autonomy in order to realize 
other goals, such as environmental p ro tec t ion . ’’^
Moreover, the more important environmental 
problems become, the more they assume “ the 
trappings of rea l is t  secur ity concerns.”8 Thus 
neorealists maintain that under such circumstances
the effect ive resolution of environmental problems 
becomes less likely.
Overcoming international environmental 
problems places opposite state object ives against 
one another. While on the one hand all states wish 
to pro tec t  public health and amenities this 
requires that they coordinate the ir  policy action 
with that of their neighbors, as environmental 
problems are transboundary. On the other hand, 
however, states also wish to “ insulate themselves 
from decisions made a b r o a d . T h u s ,  states find 
themselves in a situation where environmental 
protect ion can only be obtained by sacri f ic ing 
policy autonomy and in which policy autonomy can 
only be preserved at the cost of endangering the 
env ironment.
Kenneth, Waltz asserts that “ the co l lect ive 
goods nature of the problem of all types of shared 
pollut ion problems strongly inhibits any col lect ive 
e f fo r ts  for their  management. ” He further 
maintains that:
With a large number of actors whose 
ac t iv i t ies  need to be coordinated, the 
monitoring of national compliance is 
d i f f icu l t ,  and where none can be excluded 
from enjoying the benefits of o the rs ’
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unreciprocated pol lut ion control e f fo r ts ,  
collective action is deemed extremely 
unl ikely. ’ '
Neorealists assume that:
If countr ies did cooperate, such
arrangements would be extremely fragile 
and trans i to ry , as states would 
constantly be strongly tempted to 
defect. They would also be very narrow, 
and cover very few pol lutants, sources of 
pollut ion, or channels o f transmission, as 
states would be acting to preserve the ir  
l imited latitude of policy making 
authority. Uncertainty about the ext ent  
of pollut ion would fu rther inhibit
cooperation, by further discounting the 
value of future benefits from a cleaner 
env ironment. '2
Writers from the hegemonic s tab i l i ty  school of 
neorealism suggest that “ cooperation is most 
l ikely to occur when i t  is imposed by a dominant 
state or a ‘h e g e m o n . T h i s  hegemon would need 
to have a “ preponderance of national resources” 
including “ contro l over raw materia l, contro l  over 
sources of capital, control over markets, and 
competit ive advantages in the production of highly
n
valued g o o d s , a s  well as a will ingness to use 
them. The hegemonic s tab i l i ty  school then assumes 
that such a strong actor as described above would 
be able to persuade other states to overcome their  
resistance to cooperation.
There are two d is t inc t  schools of hegemonic 
s tab i l i ty  theory: a benign version and malevolent 
one. Their most fundamental dif ference lies in:
...their basic presumption about the 
extent of confl ic t that exists in 
international relations. This orientation 
bears on whether or not they believe 
that all states w i l l  benefit  from 
hegemonic cooperation.'5
The benign version (as presented by Robert 
Keohane and Charles Kindleberger), is based on:
a presumption that many cases of 
international cooperation are pos i t ive -  
sum games, and that all states may 
benefit  from cooperation, even though 
they are leery about in i t ia l ly  
part ic ipating, out o f fear of 
nonrec iproc ity . '6
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The hegemon pursues its own long-term 
objectives, however, all benefit  from such 
arrangements due to the nature of the issue in the 
benevolent version o f leadership. Smaller 
countries may even benefit  more that the hegemon 
in this version, for they reap benefits for which 
they do not have to pay, as the hegemon takes on 
the costs for the system to work. Nevertheless, 
cooperation is l ikely to be transitory as the 
hegemon, who having sustained the costs of 
leadership will, in time collapse.
The malevolent version (as presented by 
Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner) sees "all 
international relations as being inherently 
conf l ic tua l” as they assume that “ all states seek to 
gain control over other s t a t e s . T h e  malevolent 
version of hegemonic s tab i l i ty  assumes that “ all of 
world pol i t ics  is a zero-sum-game, as one s ta te ’s 
acquisition of power and wealth may only occur at 
anothers expense.” '® Writers of the malevolent 
version of hegemonic s tab i l i ty  maintain that the 
hegemon pursues i ts own shor t- te rm  interests. As 
cooperation takes place in accordance with the 
interests of the hegemon, other states do not wish 
to comply, thus must be forced to do so via a 
system of sanctions and rewards. However, this 
does not change the fact that these states are 
actually being forced against their  own wills to
13
cooperate, therefore, i t  is highly l ikely that they 
will  “ flee like rats from a sinking sh ip ” in the 
absence of hegemony.
Cooperation under anarchy which is ye t 
another trad it ion of the neorealism school of 
thought maintains that “ l im ited cooperation is 
possible in the absence o f hegemony, or. in its 
aftermath to prevent countr ies from reneging on 
previous commitments.
Scholars of the cooperation under anarchy 
trad it ion (such as Keohane and Alexrod) have 
suggested that countries w i l l  cooperate in order to 
acquire a number of Informational resources that 
are commonly unavailable within anarchic 
relations.2^  These scholars also believe in the need 
for “ powerful actors to intervene to create 
coordinating ins t i tu t ions;” however, they maintain 
that a number of factors may lead states to 
continue to respect the ir  agreements past the 
demise of hegemony .22
One of the most important reasons that states 
may favor cooperation in the absence of a hegemon 
is due to the reason that a situation of anarchy 
res t r ic ts  the circulation of information; therefore 
it is l ikely that states will  value cooperative 
arrangements. Information on the types of
14
pollutants, methods for their  contro l,  their  
channels of transmission and the costs for 
regulation would all make cooperation a t t rac t ive  
to states even in the absence of a hegemon. 
Keohane maintains that administrators would have 
to “ take care to guarantee the quality of 
in formation” as uncertainty about the accuracy of 
information could very well render smaller part ies 
unwill ing to cooperate.23
The historical m ate r ia l is t  t rad i t ion  views 
cooperation from an entire ly d i f fe ren t perspective. 
It sees;
a world of enduring po l i t ica l  and 
economic exp lo ita t ion  of Third World 
states by European and North American 
states, occurring at mult ip le  levels of 
interactions, as well as the domination of 
el i tes over nonelites .24
Immanuel Wallenstein of the histor ical 
mater ia l is t  school of thought maintains that the 
world is divided into three spheres according to 
the international division of labor. The highly 
developed Western countr ies (DCs) are in the core, 
the newly industr ial iz ing countries are in the 
semiperiphery and the less developed countries 
(LDCs), which export raw materials, such as
15
agricultural goods are in the periphery according 
to this division of labor.25
Historical mater ia l is ts  claim that when 
cooperation does take place, i t  is on the terms of 
the North, or the developed countries.26 They 
further maintain that relations between the 
industrialized North and the less developed South 
are part of:
a more complex, post-colonia l 
dependency of the peripheral countries, 
in which foreign capital ( international 
corporations), p ro f i t  repatr iat ion, 
adverse changes in the terms of trade 
(unequal exchange) all play a role in 
confining, d is tort ing or halting economic 
development and industr ia l izat ion.2"
For the above reasons then, scholars of the 
h istor ica l mater ia l is t  t rad i t ion  believe that 
capita l is t  exchanges with the North, or a t tempts to 
co l lec t ive ly  manage such issues as pollut ion of the 
marine environment all work to the disadvantage of 
the developing world. As regards the management 
of pol lut ion, h istorical mater ia l is ts  believe that 
arrangements would probably make LDCs pay for 
problems that do not a f fec t  them. Historical 
mater ia l is ts  believe that most concepts in
16
international relations and economic development 
have been formed by the northern experience; they 
claim that l i t t le  or no a ttent ion  has been paid to 
the conditions and in terests  of the LDCs which are 
essentially quite d i f ferent from those of the 
north.28 For this reason then, historical
mater ia l is ts doubt that the LDCs will benefit from 
environmental cooperation. The overrr ld ing
histor ical mater ia l is t  concern is that 
environmental cooperation w i l l  deepen LDC 
dependence on the North.
All the same, however, h istor ical mater ia l is ts 
predict that a fa ir amount of environmental 
cooperation will  take place in the Mediterranean. 
Yet, they also maintain that such cooperation will  
be subordinated to the broader economic and social 
factors operating in the region.
The eplstemic community school of thought is ■ 
an explanatory approach that is concerned with the 
effect that experts and knowledge-based 
communities have on governmental learning and the 
development of new state objectives. This 
approach looks into the conditions under which 
behavior may change based upon a new 
understanding of causal relationships in the world.
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The epistemic community approach is based on 
an epistemological warrant. Epistemologically, 
there is no such thing as a brute fact. Anscombe, a 
scholar in this trad i t ion  maintains that:
All interpretat ions come from a p r io r  
framework erected to organize
experience, from which certain
phenomena are identi fied as facts and 
set into a given causal framework that 
will  denote the Implications of such 
"facts. ”29
Scholars from the epistemic community 
t rad it ion believe that our in terpre ta t ion  of events 
is processed through f i l te rs ,  including those of 
pr ior experience and expectations. This shaping of 
in terpretat ions consequently gives way to a 
subjective approach in responding to 
environmental changes. They further maintain that 
“ responses to changes are often lagged.
Very few of the many forms of environmental 
pollut ion are visible. Thus environmental changes 
themselves are not immediately apparent; this 
renders states rel iant on sc ient is ts  for the 
identi f icat ion o f po Hut ants.
18
The epistemic community trad i t ion  maintains 
that leaders of the Mediterranean states would be 
l ikely to turn to regional sc ient is ts to "gain policy 
advice” when confronted with “ evidence of coastal 
po llution. ”3’
The knowledge-based group of sc ient is ts  is an 
“ epistemic community.” Haas defines an epistemic 
community as being “ a professional group that 
believe in the same cause-and-effect
relationships, truth tests to assess them, and 
shares common values.” Scientists of the epistemic 
community must share a “ common approach to 
understanding.”32 xhey must be able to draw 
similar interpretat ions from given evidence, offer  
similar advice and make s imilar policy conclusions 
if need be.
The most successful components of the Med 
Plan are those where UNEP’s epistemic focus 
combined with the interests of the marine 
scientists. The failures of the Med Plan lie in the 
areas where the epistemic community was not 
functioning as i t  should.33 The broad scient i f ic  
coalit ion was what made the components o f the Med 
Plan understandable to policymakers and it  was in 
issues that were understood by the leaders that 
success was achieved.34
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The Med Plan’s evolut ion confirms a number of 
the propositions about the epistemic community 
model. The epistemic community was consulted by 
governments so as to understand the level o f 
pollut ion. The epistemic community had a 
considerable influence on the form and duration of 
environmental cooperation. It made i tse l f  fe l t  both 
nationally and internationally.
The epistemic community was successful in 
arising public concern, sett ing the agendas, 
identi fy ing the sources o fpo l lu t ion ,  pollutants, and 
channels of pollution for regulation as well as:
... proposing specific standards ... sett ing 
the general universe of discourse by 
extending concern with discrete 
pollution problems to a more generalized 
discussion of coastal land use patterns 
and integrated planning.
The epistemic community was thus able to 
influence the range and sources of pollutants that 
were controlled, and the channels by which they 
were transmit ted. By providing the Mediterranean 
countries with t imely sc ient i f ic  evidence, it  
influenced both the pace of negotiations and its 
content.
20
By shaping the agenda and persuading the 
foreign ministry delegates of the need to control 
specific pollutants, members o f the epistemic 
community were able to achieve a more 
comprehensive scope of pol lut ion control. Those 
meetings at which the members of the epistemic 
community were present were more successful than 
the ones without them. The 1979 scienti f ic  
meetings are one example of the success that the 
presence of epistemic communities brings about. 
As Haas puts it, “ in general, meetings where 
epistemic communities are widely represented can 
be contentious, but they are likely to yield
consensus.
Three d if ferent approaches to international 
env ironiTiental cooperation were studied above. The 
international community’s ab i l i ty  to preserve the 
quality of the planet for future generations 
depends upon international cooperation. However, 
this is not as easy as it may sound, for there are 
many obstacles standing in the way of
environmental cooperation. Some factors
complicating international environmental
cooperation in general will  be described below.
First ly, the way that national governments 
perceive the threat in question affects the extent 
of the ir  cooperation. The geographical location or
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industria l ization level of a country may Influence 
the way that i t  judges the threat, as being e ither 
immediate or remote. Consequently, if the threat is 
Judged to be a remote one, then steps towards i ts 
elimination or prevention are l ikely to be 
postponed. The fact that "the actual costs and r isks 
of environmental degradation are not d is tr ibuted 
equally among all s ta te s ” renders some states less 
will ing to cooperate.
A second obstacle barring international 
environmental cooperation is that states d i f fe r  in 
their  “ perceptions of equitable solutions to 
environmental issues.” 38 in part icular, there are 
real differences between the LDCs and DCs 
regarding this matter. While the DCs which have 
already reached suff ic ien t levels of 
industr ial ization are now interested in promoting 
pollut ion control, the LDCs on the other hand, which 
are re la t ive ly  less industria l ized, are concerned 
that this would “ diminish the international 
commitment to the economic development of the ir  
reg ions.”39
“ The relat ive s trength  of a domestic 
environmental constituency is another cr i t ica l  
factor in environmental p o l i t i c s . i f  there is 
l i t t le  or no public awareness on environmental 
issues in a given state, it becomes easier for the
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government of that state to avoid international 
commitments towards international cooperation. 
Generally speaking, the public in the LDCs are more 
concerned with economic and po l i t ica l  issues and 
regard environmental ones as being very much 
insignificant. The public in the DCs on the other 
hand, are quite concerned with environmental 
issues and form organized groups which are 
effective enough to influence government 
decisions.
Yet another factor which stands in the way to 
full international cooperation is that states d i f fe r  
in their  capacity to part ic ipate in cooperative 
programs towards international environmental 
control. Some international proposals may be too 
expensive for LDCs to implement, as most solutions 
for international environmental issues require 
advanced technological and scienif ic capabil i t ies as 
well as skil led personnel, and these require vast 
amounts of capital, something that the LDCs do not 
have.
Finally, the world po l i t ica l  system Itse lf  
stands as an obstacle to international 
environmental cooperation as it  is made up of 
“ independent autonomous nation-states and 
governed by the premises of exclusive national 
sovereignty.”"*' Cooperation means that states
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accommodate their  actions in accord with the 
desires of their  partners.^2 This is turn may well 
mean that states will have to give concessions 
from their sovereignty in order to realize 
cooperation in environmental protect ion. Such 
concessions may adversely a f fec t  the national 
interests of states and create “ strong incentives
for noncooperation.
Obstacles specif ic to the Mediterranean 
Action Plan which bar the ful l  Implementation of 
agreements wil l  be studied in the final chapter of 
this work.
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CHAPTER III: DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
CONCERN ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION IN THE 
MEDITERRANEAN AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MED 
PLAN
3.1 DESCRIPTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLLUTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITS EFFECTS
Artic le 1 (1) of the Convention for the
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against 
Pollution (the Barcelona Convention) defines the 
geographical coverage of the Mediterranean as 
being:
the maritime waters of the 
Mediterranean Sea proper, including its 
gulfs and seas, bounded to the west by 
the meridian passing through Cape 
Spartel lighthouse, at the entrance of the 
Straits of Gibraltar, and to the east by 
the southern l imits o f the Straits o f the 
Dardanelles between Mehmetçik and 
Kumkale lighthouses.'
The Mediterranean, l ike other semi-enclosed 
bodies of water, is threatened by a progressive 
accumulation of various forms of po l lu t ion .2 A r t ic le
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2 (a) of the Barcelona Convention defined pollut ion 
as follows:
“ Pollut ion” means the introduction by 
man, d irect ly  or ind irect ly  of substances 
or energy into the marine environment 
which results in such deleterious e ffects  
as harm to living resources and marine 
life, hazards to human health, hindrance 
to marine act iv i t ies ,  including fishing 
and other legit imate uses of the sea, 
impairment of quality for use of sea and 
water and reduction of amenities.^
Although the terms ‘marine po l lu t ion ’ and the 
‘pollut ion of the marine environment’ are often 
used interchangeably, the proper defin it ion of the 
terms connote that the former is used to re fe r  to 
pollution arising from marine ac t iv i t ies ,  while the 
la t te r  suggests pollut ion arising from a wider 
range of sources, including land-based activities."^ 
As this study wil l  be looking into a vast scope of 
pol lutants, the second term of ‘pollut ion of the 
marine environment’ will  be used where references 
are made to po llution.
Some forms of pol lut ion such as ta r-ba l ls  on 
beaches and algae blooms near sewage outfa l ls are 
highly visible. Other forms of pollut ion such as
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industrial wastes are somewhat less obvious, 
though perhaps more serious in the long run.
Pollutants disperse very slowly in 
semlenclosed seas like the Mediterranean. 
Pollutants tend to linger near the coasts due to the 
v ir tua l lack of tides and weak currents; all the 
same, however, even though the process may be 
slow, pollutants do flow from one country to 
another.5
^  Industries and c i t ies  along the coast
The Mediterranean Sea is densely populated 
along the coast. Much of the urban and industrial 
waste that is dumped into the coastal waters is 
e ither untreated or inadequately treated.^ Very 
few of the 56 coastal c i t ies have suff ic ient sewage 
treatment faci l i t ies; most of the organic municipal 
wastes go into the sea. Such waste accounts for a 
large amount of the pollut ion. It is estimated that 
as many as 100 mil l ion people live in the 
Mediterranean coastal zone all year round and that 
an additional 100 mil l ion spend the summer in the 
are a."7
Municipal and industr ia l wastes (used oils) 
account for about one fourth of the to ta l  0.5 to 1
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mill ion tons of oil that are discharged into the sea 
each year.»
Some countries of the North Mediterranean 
now treat 50% of their  urban sewage. This is 
considered to be a d is t inct improvement of their  
beaches in the last fewyears.
*  Ships
As many as 220,000 ships carrying over 100 
tons cross the Mediterranean each year; in other 
words, 20% of international oil t ra f f ic  transits  
through 0.7% of the ear th ’s seas (this is the surface 
area of the Mediterranean Sea). The Mediterranean 
remains a dumping ground for ships despite the 
MARPOL Convention (1973) that was put into force.^
As part of standard operations, tankers 
discharge their  ballast into the sea before entering 
the harbor, and clean their  tanks with sea water. As 
much as four hundred mil l ion tons of petroleum are 
annually unloaded in the Mediterranean ports. In 
April  1979, UNEP and the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization estimated that 
constructing suff ic ient fac i l i t ies  for deballasting 
would cost the Med iterranean countries 
approximately US $145 mil l ion. Of the nineteen 
crude oil- loading terminals in the Mediterranean
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only nine have deballasting stations. Tankers 
discharge the ir  ballasts into the sea in the 
remaining ten ports without deballasting 
fa c i l i t ie s . '0
Although the Mediterranean has not 
encountered a very large oil  spil l  up to date, the 
danger is nevertheless always there. Such a spil l  
would have both a negative environmental impact 
(the extent o f which would be determined by the 
ecological vu lnerabi l i ty  of the area) as well as 
serious economic consequences through its 
negative effect on tourism.^ ’
Though oil clots are re la t ive ly  less harmful 
than other pollutants, they do nevertheless mar the 
aesthetics of beaches for tou r is t ic  purposes; they 
also clog fishermen’s nets and the engines of the ir  
boats.
Freighters and cruise ships also tend to dump 
their garbage overboard rather than saving i t  for 
disposal in p o r t . '2
^Offshore dredging and mining operations
Generating heavy concentrations of suspended 
materials in the sea, dredging operations may 
interfere with fish progeny.'3
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*  Inland sources via r ive rs
About 500 r ivers flow into the Mediterranean, 
some of which drain vast agricultural and industr ial 
regions (Ebro, Rhone, Po, Nile). Most of the 
pollut ion is carried to the Mediterranean by r ivers; 
the pollutant load they carry is higher than d irec t  
dumpings from the coast.
Moreover, radioactive wastes from inland 
nuclear power plants located in Spain, France and 
Italy are transmitted to the Mediterranean via the 
rivers. Greece and Egypt also have similar power 
plants, but these are of a smaller capacity.'^
^Agricultura l spraying
Agricultural spraying produces a runoff of 
organic and inorganic fungicides, biocides, 
pesticides, and fe r t i l i z e rs  which reaches the sea 
and (contr ibutes to the buildup of inorganic 
chemicals such as organochlorines, 
organophophattes, and carbamates) leads to 
eutrophication and the loss of fisheries in areas 
receiving heavy inputs of phosphorous and
nit rogen.’6
^  Plastics and other rubbish
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This form of pol lut ion is very d i f f icu l t  to 
quantify. Rubbish thrown overboard by crews, le f t  
behind on beaches by tour is ts ,  or dumped i l legal ly, 
ends up floating on the sea or clogging the seabed 
or l i t te r ing  beaches often quite far from where it  
o r ig in a te d .T h e  presence of such pollut ion can be 
unesthetic and offensive.'® This form of solid 
pollut ion is gradually becoming a very serious 
problem because of the time that it takes to 
d is integrate (up to 450 years for a plastic 
container) and the threat that i t  represents to 
marine animals (l ike tu r t les )  that get tangled in it 
(nets, packing material) or ingest i t  (s tyro foam). '9
The deleterious e f fec ts  of pollut ion can be 
classed into three groups as follows;
1. health
2. natural resources
3. amenities
1. Urban sewage dumped into the sea is a 
serious health hazard. It brings bacteria l and viral 
pollut ion to the seawater and causes various 
diseases including typhoid, hepat i t is  and gastro ­
enter i t is . The pathogenic organisms (these reach 
the water mainly, i f  not en t i re ly ,  through the 
discharge of domestic sewage) which are contained
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in such pollut ion can cause infection both by direct 
contact (skin ailment) during swimming and other 
water sports and by the consumption of infected 
sea food or even by accidental seawater ingestion. 
Industrial eff luents contain heavy metals which can 
create serious health problems as they go up the 
food chain and contaminate fish and shellf ish both 
of which are very popular foods with the local 
people of the Mediterranean as well as the vast 
number of tour is ts  who flock to the region each 
year. The increased mobi l i ty  of people around the 
world enhances the chances of transfer and 
d is tr ibut ion  of epidemic diseases between 
countries; this is only one example showing the 
transboundary nature of environmental pollut ion 
and what its effects can be.
2. “ Domestic sewage and other industrial 
eff luents carry fine part ic les of matter  in 
suspension which can, even in small concentrations, 
seriously affect the transparency and appearance 
of the water.” 20 Domestic sewage contains plant 
nutr ients which encourage the growth of minute 
free swimming algae and thus cloud the c lar i ty  of 
the water. These plan nutr ients also lead to the 
growth of seaweed on the beaches which again is 
quite unaesthetic in appearance, especial ly when 
the plants decompose. Pollution which reduces the 
attract iveness of the beaches and the Inshore
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waters also is l ikely to have an adverse effect on 
the popularity of the Med iterranean for tourists. 
Any outbreak of i ll health a ttr ibu tab le  to 
contaminated sea water, e ither through bathing or 
contaminated sea food tends to receive widespread 
international publ ic i ty and thus has negative 
consequences for the tourism sector o f the area.2’
3. Water pollut ion has many diverse effects on 
fisheries. Marine pollut ion very seriously affects 
fishing stocks already threatened by excessive 
fishing.
Images of coastal waters choked with 
gelatinous mass where hundreds of dead fish f loat 
are common images presented by the mass media. 
This phenomenon, called eutrophication, is caused 
by excessive concentration in the sea of nutr ient 
salts brought down by agricultural run-off and 
r ive rs  (phosphates and n i t ra tes  of fe r t i l ize rs ,  
urban■ sewage, detergents). Through their  decay, 
these nutr ient salts cause pro l i fe ra t ion  of the 
microscopic algae (phytoplankton) which consume 
all the oxygen available in the water: fish and 
crustaceans all die because o f the lack of oxygen. 
Eutrophication phenomena are common in the deltas 
of the large r ive rs  (Po, Rhone, Ebro) and in the bays 
which receive large amounts of untreated sewage.22
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3.2 INTERNATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS TOWARDS 
POLLUTION ARISES
Following World War II, the world became 
indifferent to most everything with the possible 
exception of a nuclear confl ict. Towards the end of 
the 60s and the beginning o f the 70s, the long spell 
was broken.23
The Mediterranean states f i rs t  confronted 
evidence of pollut ion in the 1960s. The coastal area 
and harbors had long been polluted by Industrial 
growth, but the increasing tanker use of the sea in 
the 60s had greatly intensified the problems.24
Although concerned about pollut ion by the late 
60s, governments lacked any real sc ient i f ic  
knowledge about marine pollut ion. Concern was 
dominated by the most v is ib le  type of marine 
pollution: “ tar balls from tanker op orations. "25 i t  
was in this atmosphere o f uncertainty that 
governments began to look into ways of gaining 
information about the sources, types and degree of 
pollution and what could be done to improve the 
quality of the Mediterranean.
International concern about environmental 
threats rose in the 1970s. Concern also developed 
about the long distances that pollutants could
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travel, that is to say the ir  transboundary nature. 
The international community responded by devising 
new co l lec t ive  measures to control transboundary 
pollution, in September 1970 the IOC’s Group of 
Experts on Long-Term Scientif ic Policy and 
Planning identi f ied the Mediterranean (along with 
the Baltic, the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and 
the Sea of Japan) as an area that was potent ia l ly  
severely threatened by po l lu t ion .26
Environmental issues were f i r s t  popularized 
international ly at the United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in 1972. They 
have remained on the International agenda since. It 
was at this conference that marine pollut ion was 
identi f ied as a key problem. While 16 
recommendations covered pollut ion in general, 
another nine dealt specif ica l ly with marine
pol lut ion.27
However, these in i t ia t ives  were not enough. 
Information was often scanty and various studies of 
the Mediterranean were not comparable with each 
other. There was no hard ev idence of env ironmental 
pollut ion besides the visual evidence of oil 
pollution. All  the same, popular sc ient i f ic  accounts 
were quite e f fec t ive  at increasing concern about 
pollution. However, decision makers were s t i l l  
ignorant about the sources and ex ten t of pollut ion.
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Moreover, most countr ies lacked the capabil i t ies 
and equipment to assess the ir  own pollution. At a 
scienti f ic  meeting he Id in February I 974, sc ientis ts 
concluded that:
The attention drawn to the impact of 
pollution on marine communities is too 
recent and, as a result ,  data is s t i l l  to 
spare for it to be possible to draw an 
overall picture of the situation. 
Furthermore, the word ‘po l lu t ion ’ is used 
to cover very d i f fe ren t  attacks, both in 
kind and in intensity and pollut ion may 
r ightly  be considered to include thermal 
effluents just as much as the discharge 
of excavation waste, industrial waste, 
and urban eff luents.2®
In 1972, Lord Peter R itch ie-Calder alerted the 
world that;
The Mediterranean Sea is sick. It needs 
Intensive care, day and night nursing. By 
nature it has always been delicate but its 
condition has grievously deter iorated in 
recent years. The short term prognosis 
is obvious: on present trends, things will 
get worse because the effects will  be 
multiplied and magnified by the increase
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in industr ial ac t iv i ty .  Recreational 
beaches wil l  be out of bound for bathers. 
Seafood will  be a health hazard. In terms 
of epidemic diseases, the Mediterranean 
can become a biological time bomb. The 
trees wil l  be dying around the coasts, 
suffocated or poisoned by polluted sea 
winds.2^
The Economist reported on March 30 1973 that;
(the Mediterranean’s) ecological balance 
was not seriously disturbed until the 
early 1960s. Now overpopulation, the 
tour is t boom, industrial development and 
maritime irresponsib i l i ty  are combining 
to turn it into a dead sea.^o
Such 'gloom-and-doom' prophesies worked to 
establish environmental consciousness and a need 
to work cooperatively to devise new col lect ive 
measures to control transboundary pollution.
3.3 INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
The IOC launched the Cooperative 
Investigations in the Mediterranean (CIM), a joint 
research programme in 1 971. However, the major i ty
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of Mediterranean coastal s tates rejected Clh, as 
they thought it to be an “ attempt by outside 
powers to use marine sc ient i f ic  research as a cover 
for resources explo itat ion and intell igence 
gathering." As amusing as i t  may sound in the new 
age of sate l l i te  technology, the Mediterranean 
countries suspected CIM of being a front, for either 
the Soviet Union or the United States by which they 
would be able to gain data about the ocean floor, 
which they could later use for hiding submarines.^·
The General Fisheries Council for the 
Mediterranean (GFCM) of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) had formed a working party in 
cooperation with the International Commission for 
the Scientif ic Exploration of the Mediterranean 
(ICSEM) in March 1969.^2  |n March 1972, the, GFCM 
presented The Review on the State of Marine 
Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea, at the eleventh 
session of the GFCM that was held in Athens. The 
report  which was the f i r s t  comprehensive review of 
the state of pollut ion in the Mediterranean included 
a number of sources of pollut ion that all posed 
potential threats to public health; the report 
concluded that pollut ion in the Mediterranean had 
reached a c r i t ica l  level.
The GFCM repor t  (which would provide the only 
sc ienti f ic  information about the extent o f  pollut ion
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in the Mediterranean for the next five years) 
identi fied the principle sources of pol lut ion as 
being untreated and inadequately treated sewage 
and industria l waste, in addit ion to oil pol lut ion 
from tanker tra f f ic .  The princip le channels for 
transmission of sewage and industr ia l wastes were 
identif ied as being r ivers, marine outf lows, and 
pipe lines.
In it ial ly concern was d irected towards the 
most vis ible type of pollut ion: oil pol lut ion
resulting from tanker operations, which accounted 
for oil emissions of 300,000 - 500,000 tons. There 
were no available data that demonstrated the 
existence of widespread pol lut ion from sources 
other than oil.
The conclusions of the GFCM report were found 
to be part icularly interest ing, since pollut ion from 
ships due to its high v is ib i l i t y  had, as mentioned, 
been widely regarded as the main issue. A f te r  
reading Review on the State of Marine Pollution in 
the Mediterranean Sea, the GFCM states called upon 
the FAO to take action for a “ convention to contro l 
the discharge into the sea of pollutants that would 
affect its l iving resources, bearing in mind the 
economic e f fects  o f such c o n t r o l , a s  well as to 
develop p i lo t  p ro jects  for monitoring pollution. 
The legal office o f  the FAO drafted a treaty in 1947
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that included all other Mediterranean pollut ion 
control e f forts .
The GFCM repor t  had convinced countries of 
the need for international action to combat 
pollut ion; they also realized that the range of 
problems exceeded the FAO’s narrow focus on 
living resources. However, the Med iterranean 
states lacked any real information on the extent of 
pollut ion, i ts sources and then methods for 
control l ing them. It was with this reason on mind 
that in August 1974Spain o f f ic ia l ly  Invited UNEP to 
“ d irect regional e f fo r ts  to coordinate marine 
pollut ion contro l. ” “ UNEP with its catalyt ic  mission 
and comprehensive approach was just the 
organization to conduct such an enterpr ise.” ·^^
Together with the GFCM, IOC, and ICSEM, UNEP 
cosponsored the International Workshop on Marine 
Pollution in the Med iterranean between 9-14 
September 1974.35 it was th is technical meeting 
that served to set the agenda for all subsequent 
pollut ion discussions. By procuring consensus an 
extremely comprehensive l ist of sources and 
channels of pollut ion, UNEP established a base by 
which it  could accordingly develop controls for this 
comprehensive l is t  of po llutants later on.
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UNEP solic i ted input from forty  of the reg ion ’s 
marine scientists to develop a selection of studies. 
The seven monitoring and research pro jects  that 
were developed thus ref lected a compromise 
between the d if ferent alliances at the meeting. 
Moreover, they encompassed a comprehensive set 
of sources and types of pollut ion.
1. Baseline studies and monitoring of oil and 
petroleum hydrocarbons,
2. Baseline studies and monitoring of 
metals, part icularly mercury,
3. Baseline studies and monitoring of DDT, 
PCBs, and other chlorinated hydrocarbons in marine 
organisms,
4. The effects o f pollutants on marine 
organisms and their populations,
5. The effects o f pollutants on marine 
communities and ecosystems,
6. The coastal t ransport of pollut ion,
7. A coastal water quality control p ro ject to 
correlate pollut ion of the sea and pathogenic 
infections in seafood and public health.
These projects would later be adopted at the 
Barcelona convention.
3.4 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MED PLAN
41
Following extensive preparatory ac t iv i t ies  
involving a number of United Nations bodies, UNEP 
convened the Intergovernmental Meeting on the 
Protection of the Mediterranean in Barcelona, 
between January 28 and February 4 1975.^^
Representatives of sixteen of the Mediterranean 
l i t to ra l  governments (Algeria, Egypt, France, 
Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, 
Morocco, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia)^^ attended the meeting at the end of 
which the Mediterranean Action Plan (Med Plan) was 
adopted.
Designed by UNEP, the Med Plan is a co l lect ive 
e f fo r t  to coordinate the marine pollut ion control 
practices of all eighteen Mediterranean countries. 
Under the Med. Plan, the Mediterranean 
governments jo in t ly  conduct monitoring and 
research, and develop and diffuse actual coastal 
management practices to reduce pol lut ion. It 
establishes areas in which countr ies may develop 
projects to control various aspects of pollution. It 
not only represents the in terests  of all of the 
l i t to ra l  countries, but also addit ional components 
pertaining to “ UNEP’s desire of promoting 
integrated economic planning to regional 
planners. ”“=*0
3.5 THE COMPONENTS OF MED PLAN
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The Med Plan consists of four interconnected 
components:
A. The integrated planning of the 
development and management of the resources of 
the Mediterranean Basin.
B. A coordinated pollut ion monitoring and 
research program in the Mediterranean.
C. A framework convention and related 
protocols with technical annexes for the protection 
of the Mediterranean environment.
D. Insti tutional and financial implications of 
the action plan.^'
All four components of the Med iterranean 
Action Plan are interdependent. They provide a 
framework for comprehensive action to promote 
both the protect ion and the continued development 
of the Mediterranean ecoregion.
The legal components of the Med Plan were 
devised so as to support the already ongoing 
exercises under UNEP’s supervision. This 
component was underway by February 1975 (2-16) 
at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries of the 
Coastal States of the Mediterranean Region for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea in Barcelona.
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The sixteen governments that attended the 
meeting approved the following legal instruments;
1. Convention for the protect ion of the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (Barcelona 
convention);
2. Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution 
of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships 
and A irc ra f t  (the dumping protocol);
3. Protocol concerning Cooperation in 
Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by 
Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of 
Emergency (the emergency protocol)M2
The tex t  for the Barcelona Convention was 
adopted on 15 February 1975 by the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries of the. Coastal States of the 
Med iterranean Region for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea, at Barcelona. It came into force 
on 12 February 1978.^^ The convention served as 
the Med Plan’s legal framework for subsequent 
pollution control efforts.
The underlying philosophy of the governments 
was to organize a system, which would, on a 
permanent basis, monitor the "health of the 
M e d i t e r r a n e a n . I t  was very broad in scope; it  
laid out s ta tes ’ general commitment to pro tec t  the 
Mediterranean as fol lows in Art ic le  4 of the
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Convention For the Protection of the Mediterranean 
Sea Against Pollution:
1. The Contracting Parties shall 
individually or jo in t ly  take all 
appropriate measures in accordance with 
the provisions of this Convention and 
those protocols in force to which they 
are party, to prevent, abate and combat 
pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area 
and to enhance the marine environment in
t h a t  a r e a . 4 5
The Barcelona Convention specified the forms 
of pollut ion for which controls should be 
implemented as being:
1. Pollution caused by dumping from ships and 
a ircraft ,
2. Pollution from ships,
3. Pollution resulting from exploration and 
explo itat ion of the continental shelf and the sea­
bed and its sub-soil, and
4. Pollution from land-based s o u r c e s . 46
The convention fu r ther  provides for 
cooperation in dealing with pol lut ion emergencies 
and scienti f ic  monitoring and research, as well as 
scienti f ic  and technological cooperation.
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“ When adopting the Barcelona Convention, the 
Mediterranean governments also signed the two 
in i t ia l  protocols giving the legal agreement its
‘te e th ’ ”47;
The f i r s t  protocol, the Protocol for the 
Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by 
Dumping from Ships and A irc ra f t  deals with the 
dumping of pollutants from ships and aircraft . The 
contracting parties to the protocol agreed to; 
“ take all appropriate measures to prevent and 
abate pollut ion of the Mediterranean Sea Area 
caused by dumping from ships and a irc ra f t . ”
The most dangerous wastes 
mercury, cadmium, crude oil, 
hydrocarbons, pesticides, and
including
chlorinated
radioactive
substances - were all 'b lack l is ted ’ in annex 1 of 
art ic le 4. The dumping of b lackl is t wastes was 
prohibited by Art ic le  4 o f t h e  protocol.
A second or ‘g re y ’ l is t  which includes the 
somewhat less noxious materia ls such as arsenic, 
lead, copper, zinc, beryl l ium, chromium, nickel, 
cyanides, fluorides and some synthetic organic 
chemicals was listed in Annex 11 of Art ic le  5. 
Art ic le  5 called for “ a p r io r  special permit  from
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the competent national a u th o r i t ie s ” for the 
clumping of these wastes.
Article 5 of the protocol calls for a “ pr ior  
general permit from competent national
a u t h o r i t i e s ” 5 0  for the clumping of all other wastes 
or other matter.
In August 1979 the Med iterranean states 
developed both standardized forms for issuing 
dumping permits and an annual reporting system by 
which they would report the number of permits 
issued and the amount of wastes dumped annually.
The second protocol, the Protocol Concerning 
Cooperation In Combating Pollution o f the
Mediterranean .Sea by Oil and Other Harmful 
Substances in Cases of Emergency, or the 
emergency protocol as it  is known for short, calls 
on states to noti fy each other in case of an oil spil l 
5' and for cooperation among the parties:
... in cases of grave and imminent danger 
to the marine environment, the coast or 
related interests... due to the presence 
of massive quantit ies of oil or other 
harmful substances result ing from 
accidental causes or an accumulation of 
small discharges which are pollut ing or
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threatening to pol lute the sea (Art ic le
D .5 2
The t ext  for the emergency protocol was 
adopted on 16 February 1976 by the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries of the Coastal States of the 
Mediterranean Region for the Protection o f the 
Mediterranean Sea, at Barcelona. It came into force 
on 12 February 1978. By October 1991, all 18 
Mediterranean states and the EEC had become 
parties to this Protocol.
A resolution calling on the Executive Director 
to “ continue the preparatory work for a draft  
Protocol for the Protection o f the Mediterranean 
Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources" 
was also adopted at the Conference of
Plenipo tentiaries.53
UNEP and the World Health Organization (WHO) 
jo in t ly  convened an Intergovernmental Consultation 
concerning a Draft Protocol fo r  the Protect ion of 
the Mediterranean Sea against pollut ion from Land- 
Based Sources at Athens from 7-1 1 February 1977, 
in response to this request. Pollution from “ man’s 
ac t iv i t ies  on land” was declared as being the "most 
significant source of pol lu t ion in the Mediterranean 
Basin” at the Intergovernmental Review Meeting 
held in Geneva in February 1979.54
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Negotiations for the ra t i f ica t ion  of the Land- 
Based Sources Protocol took three years. A f te r  
being considered at the intergovernmental 
consultat ion held in Athens in 1977, legal 
discussions took place “ in October 1977 in Venice, 
in January 1978 in Monaco, in June 1979 in Geneva, 
and at the final May 1980 Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries in Athens^s. The Land-Based 
Sources Protocol was final ly adopted at this 
conference on 17 May 1 980. It came into force on 17 
June 1983. By October 1991, 16 o f the 18 
Mediterranean states (with the exception of 
Lebanon and Syria) had become part ies to this 
pro tocol.
With the Land-Based Sources Protocol, the 
Mediterranean countries d irected their  attent ion 
to controll ing a new and important source of 
pol lut ion. The treaty expanded to cover the entire 
range of land-based pol lutants: “ discharges from 
rivers, coastal establishments or outfal ls, or any 
other land-based sources.” 56 i t  banned a number of 
agricultural compounds used as fungicides, 
biocides and pesticides; it also covered a number 
of industries, thermal pol lutants from energy 
generation and municipal wastes. The protocol also 
came to include those pol lutants transmitted by 
r ivers  and through the atmosphere. “ By supporting
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this new treaty countries agreed to adopt new 
industrial and agricultural practices, as well as 
building sewage s y s t e m s . ”57
In Apri l  1 982, the Mediterranean states signed 
a new protocol which was outside the scope of the 
program that had been set out in the Barcelona 
convention and in the Med Plan. Nine of the sixteen 
states that had attended the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries signed the Protocol Concerning 
the Mediterranean Specially Protected Areas, which 
“ encouraged the creation and development of 
marine parks to preserve regionally endangered 
species, in particular the Mediterranean monk 
seal.”58 The tex t  for the protocol was adopted on 
March 23 1986. By October 1991, 15 Mediterranean 
States and the EEC had become parties to this 
pro tocol.59
The. legal component of the Med Plan can be 
said to have been quite successful; as Peter Haas 
puts it, the legal scope of the plan:
has grown from treating only oil 
pollution to control l ing land-based 
sources of pollut ion as well as 
conserving species. Its strength has 
grown from broad exhortations in the 
Barcelona convention to specific
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guidelines for selected substances, with 
more to come.
The assessment component of the
Mediterranean Action Plan was included so as to 
generate data on the actual state of pollut ion in 
the region. Init ially it was more of a monitoring 
proposal than a research proposal; only later did it  
come to include more research.
Known as Med Pol, the assessment component 
of the Mediterranean Action Plan received the 
greatest support from governments. As most 
states did not know the state of pollut ion in the 
Med iterranean, their utmost p r io r i ty  was 
ascertaining the degree of pollut ion before 
adopting concrete measures for controll ing it. As 
Peter S. Thacher reports  in his art ic le The 
Mediterranean Action Plan published in a 1977 issue 
of AMBIO:
Much is known about the general 
movement of water entering the 
Mediterranean through the Stra it  of 
Gibraltar and the main r ivers. There is a 
counter-clock-wise current around its 
two main basins, and pollutants are 
centr i fugal ly driven against the coasts.
There are, however, no precise data
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available about pol lutant levels, nor 
about the paths they travel in part icular 
areas. Until recent ly, research and 
monitoring inst itut ions in the coastal 
states used d if fe ren t methodologies and 
types of equipment, and were unable to 
compare results with one a n o t h e r . ^ !
Med Pol got underway very soon following the 
Barcelona conference. Seven p i lo t  pro jects  were 
approved at the 1975 Intergovernmental Meeting in 
Barce lona.'^2 The actual studies were conducted by 
laboratories nationally. The findings were 
consolidated into reports with support from 
international agencies. Day-to-day coordination of 
the Med Pol p ro jects  was carried out by the FAO, 
WHO, and IOC.
Adding to the seven init ia l  projects, six new 
projects were approved following the 1976 
Barcelona meeting. Only two of these p ro jec ts  were 
completed. The most important of these was a 
study of land-based sources (Med X) which was 
completed in conjunction with the discussion on the 
Land-Based Source Protocol. In tercal ibrat ion 
exercises were conducted between national 
inst itut ions part ic ipating in Med Pol. The 
contracting part ies later approved:
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^  Bioge ochem ica 1 studies of selected 
pollutants in the open waters o f the Mediterranean, 
^  Studies of the role of sedimentat ion in 
pollut ing the Mediterranean,
*  Studies of the input of pol lutants from the 
atmosphere,
*  The modeling of marine systems.
None of the above pro jec ts  were completed 
due to their  complexity and lack of money for the ir  
support. Al l the same, however, the Med X report  
was of great importance for  i t  successfully 
demonstrated the need for dealing with land-based 
sources of pollutants and pol lu t ion transmit ted by 
rivers.
The assessment component contr ibuted to the 
perpetuation of the Med Plan in a number of ways:
It sealed the alliance between UNEP and 
marine scientists, i t  rewarded 
governments for part ic ipat ing in the 
separate legal discussions by providing a 
symbolic recognition o f the ir  sc ien t i f ic  
stature through the choice of lead 
laboratories, and it created a sc ient i f ic  
consensus which demonstrated the need 
to t rea t  a broad range of sources, 
channels, and types o f  pol lut ion.^3
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Integrated planning is the Med Plan’s least 
successful component. The Mediterranean countr ies 
took more of an interest in the other components 
of the plan, part ly because this component was 
never as well understood or  accepted as the other 
components. Thus it took a very long time to 
develop projects for integrated management and 
many of the projects are s t i l l  only in nascent 
forms.
The integrated planning component floundered 
around until 1977 and then was separated into a 
“ visionary integrated modeling exercise and a set 
of concrete pro jects to study and d is t r ibute  
environmentally benign technologies.
In March 1975, UNEP accepted a French offer  to 
prepare a “ Blue Book” which would operationalize 
the integrated planning component of the 
Mediterranean Action pIan.64 Later dubbed the ‘Blue 
Plan,’ this project is perhaps the most important 
ac t iv i ty  of the management component of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan.65 The Blue Plan is the 
fu ture-or iented, socio-economic component o f  the 
Med Plan.66 it calls for:
...systemic survey of major development
and environmental p ro tec t ion  ac t iv i t ies
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carried out in the region and prospective 
studies of development trends based on 
the collection of data from the various 
countries of the region. The exchange of 
information among countries is a 
fundamental aspect o f the Blue Plan.^"
The Blue Plan was adopted by the coastal 
states which met in Split ,  Yugoslavia between 31 
and February 4, 1977 (Albania did not part ic ipa te  in 
the Split Conference; Syria and Lebanon were also 
absent at Split for conjunctural reasons).
The Blue Plan was assigned the task of 
providing insights into the safeguarding approach 
and of studying the dangers actually threatening 
the whole of the region, in the medium and long 
term. The Blue Plan undertook “ an explorat ion of 
the dif ferent possible features open to the 
Mediterranean basin, based on the dynamic study of 
interactions between human populations, the ir  
ac t iv i t ies  and natural milieux.”'^ 3
The Pr ior i ty  Actions Programme (PAP), 
init iated simultaneously with the Blue Plan, also 
stimulates sound environmental management. While 
the Blue Plan operates at the research and planning 
level, PAP offers a d irect ,  practical approach to 
environmental problems.
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PAP consists of six p r io r i t y  studies selected 
from the l is t of Blue Plan surveys. This selection 
was a compromise of all the concerns that the 
Mediterranean countries voiced at the Split 
meeting. The fields of a c t iv i ty  chosen were those 
thought to best represent the common experience 
and needs of Mediterranean countries. The p r io r i ty  
studies chosen were; “ soil protect ion, water 
resource management, fisheries and aquaculture 
management, human sett lements , tourism, and 
‘s o f t ’ energy technologies.
PAP was lacking in financial sources unti l 1980 
when countries began to contr ibute to the Med 
Plan’s budget. Funding disagreements between 
UNDP and UNEP hindered progress in the f i r s t  few 
years and it was not unti l 1984 that the pro jects 
and seminars got g o i n g .
Addit ional projects, largely serving the LDCs’ 
concerns with developing methods for coping with 
urban poverty, a lternative inexpensive energy 
sources, and technology transfer were approved in 
subsequent years. PAP pro jects  have now come to 
include “ integrated planning and management of 
the coastal zones, the rehab i l i ta t ion  of h is tor ic  
sett lement, land use planning in earthquake zones, 
and solid and liquid waste d i s p o s a l . ”7' But, it was
56
not until the 1990s that PAP really began its 
act iv it ies.
The Mediterranean states formed an 
inst i tu t ional structure to support Med Plan 
operations following the entry into force of the 
Barcelona convention in February 1978, Originally 
coordination had been run out of UNEP’s Regional 
Seas Office in Geneva; however, problems arose 
once UNEP created similar projects for other 
regional seas because it  committed excessive 
funds to the Mediterranean region. 7.2 % of UNEP’s 
Environment Fund resources were allocated to the 
Mediterranean region between 1973 and 1975. It 
was for this reason that the Mediterranean s ta tes 
approved a Mediterranean Trust Fund in July 1979 
to finance the Med Plan’s act iv i t ies.
The Mediterranean states pledged amounts 
proport ional to their  overall  UN schedules. Prior to 
the creation of the Trust Fund, UNEP had been 
responsible for supporting pract ical ly the entire 
Med Plan. Once the Trust Fund was established, 
UNEP was able to decrease its financial 
involvement in the plan. The overal l  contr ibutions 
to the Trust Fund through 1986 were as follows:
UNEP contr ibuted $US 7.8 mill ion ... other
UN agencies added another 6.6 mil l ion
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dollars, while the seventeen 
participating governments gave 13.3 
million dollars. The EEC provided $US 2.2
million.72
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CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION: OBSTACLES HINDERING 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS: CAN
ATTEMPTS AT OVERCOMING THEM BE BASE TO 
FURTHER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION?
It is very d i f f icu l t  and sometimes even 
impossible to ful ly implement agreements of the 
Med Plan for there are many obstacles standing in 
the way of implementation. For one thing, the 
international management of such issues as 
transboundary pollut ion challenges the very core 
of the legal order, which, as set by the Westphalian 
Treaty of 1648 is based on the sovereign r ight o f 
states to control ac t iv i t ies  within national 
borders, that is to say, to recognize no higher 
authority then i tse l f  in this respect.?
States are so attached to the ir  autonomy that 
they are hesistant about perm it t ing  incursions on 
it in order to realize other goals, such as 
environmental p ro tec t ion .2
No d i f fe ren t  from any other state, the 
Mediterranean states are very  much attached to 
their autonomy and thus res is t  serious incursions 
on it. As Haas puts it:
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Po we r an cl co n t ro I were prominent 
concerns for the Med iterranean 
governments. Both large and small states 
voiced concern that the ir  economic 
comparative advantage could be 
jeopardized by part ic ipating in the Med 
Plah, as they required the ir  ihdustries to 
introduce costly pol lut ion contro l 
equipment which would inhibit the ir  
ab i l i ty  to compete interhational ly by 
addihg to their  costs. They did not want 
to be made vulnerable to possible 
external control over the ir  national 
economic ac t iv i t ies  and choices, which 
for many developing countries were a 
major security consideration - both as a 
symbol of modernity and independence 
and as a source of employment for the ir  
rapidly growihg populations. Each 
governmeht needed reassurance that the 
program would tru ly re f le c t  i ts own 
preferences for which pollutahts would 
be controlled, that it would not sustain 
costs while other sta tes rode free ly,  ahd 
that its economy would not absorb 
unacceptable costs in complying with the 
arrangement.-
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The absence of an international authority·^ or 
what could be thought of as an international police 
force to enforce the law is another factor that 
adversely affects the implementation of 
agreements, for there is no penalty that is 
effect ive enough to make each country comply with 
agreements.
As d if fe ren t countr ies wanted to use the 
Mediterranean for d i f fe ren t  purposes, they 
disagreed about the level of environmental quality 
that was desirable. With already polluted 
coastlines, the industrialized countries wished to 
promote ‘a cleaner Med Iterranean,·’ they argued 
that the entire sea should be cleaned and that all 
l i t to ra l  states should contr ibute to the process. 
The less developed countr ies on the other hand, 
had re la t ive ly  prist ine coastlines, and were 
Interested in normalizing standards that would 
require the DCs to contro l their  emissions while 
allowing themselves to continue to pollute up to a 
higher threshold. In essence, the LDCs fe l t  that 
they could to lerate a d i r t i e r  sea than could the 
North. The degree of cleanliness from which all 
would benefit  was not agreed upon: the DCs argued 
that the entire sea should be cleaned and that all 
l i t to ra l  states must contr ibute to create a cleaner 
sea, whereas the LDCs fe l t  that they could to lerate 
a d i r t ie r  sea than could the North for the sake of
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industr ia l izat ion and that the DCs should pay for its 
orotect ion, havina been more resoonsible for its 
pollution. Moreover, the LDCs fe l t  that the 
problems treated co l lec t ive ly  would only be those 
of the DCs. Thus, although all may benefit  in some 
fashion from a cleaner sea, there are real 
dif ferences about how clean a sea should be 
co l lec t ive ly  pursued.s
Countries also disagreed about the range of 
pollutants to control. Each country wishes to 
control pol lutants that more or less relates to the 
stage of development that they themselves stand 
at. They focus on pollutants that pertain to the ir  
own economic development. Writers d i f fe ren t ia te  
between a ‘pollut ion of p o ve r ty ’ in developing 
countries (which essential ly refers to pol lut ion 
problems affecting public health that could in 
essence be resolved through economic
development and an improved quality of l i fe) and a 
‘pol lut ion of affluence' in developed countries. 
Developed countries are interested in resolving 
pollut ion problems associated with affluence, such 
as pollut ion by heavy metals that are caused by 
industr ial emissions. Less developed countr ies are 
more concerned with resolving problems
associated with poverty  such as untreated 
municipal wastes (i.e. organic matter, detergents 
and nu t r ien ts ). De ve lop ed states with old
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infr.Tntriirturor. that lack suff ic ient 
systems also face the same problem.*^
; e wa a e
Economic controversy over who will  pay for 
environmental p ro tec t ion  also stands as an 
obstacle to the Implementation of agreements. 
Although everyone could benefit  from a clean 
environment, “ the actual d is t r ibut ion  o f costs to 
be sustained for the cleaning of the environment" 
is a highly controversial issue and shif ts the 
“ nature of the negotiations from a pos i t ive -sum- 
game to a zero-sum one.” /
The negotiations process for the land-based 
sources protocol v iv id ly  demonstrates the 
recurring disagreements between the LDCs and DCs. 
LDC and DC off ic ials disagreed about the channels 
of transmission to be covered, whether the 
protocol would cover new or exist ing instal lat ions; 
and whether pollut ion would be regulated by 
ambient or emission standards.
As was the case with may other elements of 
the Med Plan, the LDCs were in i t ia l ly  extremely 
suspicious that the entire notion of the land-based 
sources protocol was “ merely a ruse” to constrain 
LDC development “ by introducing additional 
production costs to the ir  industr ia l ization plans.”8
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LDC o ff ic ia ls  also viewed the substances listed 
in the annexes (I & II) to the Land-Based Sources 
Protocol (the ‘b lack ’ and ‘g re y ’ l ist wastes) with 
great suspicion. Moreover, they lacked detai led 
sc ient i f ic  information about the extent to which 
banning or control l ing emissions of these 
substances would affect the ir  economies.
Rather than objecting to specific substances, 
LDC delegates preferred to “ drag their  heels unti l  
they were convinced of the overall  necessity of 
banning such substances.
LDC off ic ia ls  also suspected the integrated 
management component of the Med Plan as being an 
“ instrument of control over LDC industr ial ization, 
or as a northern device to get LDCs to divulge 
sensit ive socioeconomic data."''^
Pollution control entai ls additional production 
costs. Thus, each country has a strong incentive to 
defect to o f fe r  its local producers a comparative 
advantage over their  regional compet itors with 
higher production costs resulting from the 
introduction of pollut ion control equipment.
All states suffered from pollut ion to some 
extent, but their common concern for 
environmental degradation in the Mediterranean
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was overwhelmed by such concerns as those 
mentioned above. Squabble over marginal gains 
prevailed over the pursuit of absolute gains for all.
Although there was ample opportunity  for a 
country to acquire some absolute gains from both 
the components of the Med Plan and from a cleaner 
coastline, negotiations were nevertheless many a 
time overshadowed by fights over who must pay for 
pollut ion control efforts.
LDCs fe l t  that their  trade would be adversely 
affected as the DCs adopted s t r ic te r  product 
standards, for they thought that this would re s t r i c t  
their own export possib i l i t ies. Haas maintains that 
the LDCs fe l t  that the high cost of environmental 
cleanup and protect ion might s ign if icantly  detract 
from money available for industr ia l ization.
LDCs interpreted e f fo r ts  to control marine 
pollut ion as indirect ways of retarding the ir  
attempts at industria l ization. LDCs and DCs d if fered 
so much in their  in terests  that, while pol lut ing 
smokestacks were viewed as being bad by the DCs, 
the LDCs saw them as being symbols of 
modernization and therefore good. The LDCs 
resented the DC posit ion in th is respect, which they 
saw as denying their  countr ies the middle-class 
pr iv i leges that the North enjoyed.
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The LDCs were also concerned that the 
“ infusion of sophisticated pol lut ion contro l 
technologies would worsen the problem of 
inappropriate technologies in the Third World 
countr ies.” "  LDCs were fu r ther  concerned that 
“ a ttempts to control po l lu t ion would d ive r t  
resources from economic development.” Their main 
concern was improving the welfare o f the ir  
populations and they saw industr ia l izat ion as the 
path to the welfare that they sought. They believed 
that the costs that pollut ion control entailed would 
retard the rate of industria l ization.
A I 97 1 USIAD survey found;
l i t t le  evidence of awareness of 
environmental problems among the 
peoples of developing countries, or 
among their  government administrators 
... Many countries are preoccupied with 
the development of their  natural 
resources, and to the extent that 
concern does exist for the environment, 
there appears to be apprehension that 
social and economic costs of 
environmental p ro tect ion may very well 
out-weigh the benef i ts . '2
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Algerian President Hoari Boumedienne was so 
much against the idea of environmental p ro tect ion  
(due to the reasons stated above), that he said; " i f  
improving the environment means less bread for 
the Algerians, then 1 am against i t "  (NOVA 1980). 
Along with various other LDC delegates, 
Boumedienne “ questioned the very des irab i l i ty  of 
cooperation with the North,
The Algerian representat ive to the UNCHE held 
very much the same views as Boumedienne and 
announced that Algeria would not sacrifice 
development at the altar o f the environment.
President Chadli Benjedid who replaced 
Boumedienne a f te r  his death in 1979, continued the 
late p res ident ’s emphasis on autonomy in economic 
decision making, along with a commitment to 
cooperation among LDCs to reduce dependence on 
the North.
Algeria was so much against control l ing 
industrial pollut ion that a United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) consultant ’s 
demonstration of the extensive pol lut ion of 
Algerian harbors was denied by the government. It 
actually took Algeria ten years to acknowledge the 
need to contro l industr ial wastes.
67
Many LDCs suspected that the entire notion of 
environmental p ro tec t ion  was merely a conscious 
or unconscious method of control l ing LDC 
development and maintaining exist ing patterns of 
dependence. Most LDCs (with the exception of 
Egypt and Lebanon, for these two LDCs had 
domestic monitoring capabil i t ies) lacked both the 
equipment and trained personnel to evaluate their  
own water quality, thus to a great extent were 
uncertain of the level o f pol lut ion. In fact, there 
was no data available demonstrating the existence 
of widespread pollut ion from sources other than 
oil. Fishery yields had declined s l ight ly in the 
Med iterranean from 1968-1969, but this was 
generally viewed to be a result  of widespread 
overfishing. 5 At the same time, they thought that 
the technical pollut ion advice provided by the DCs 
would be inappropriate or  biased and would 
reinforce patterns of dependence. Some delegates 
from Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey more 
fundamentally fe l t  that the entire Med Plan was 
merely a ' t r i c k ’ that had been developed by the DCs 
to further dominate and exp lo i t  developing 
countries by making them pay for pollut ion 
problems caused by the developed countries. They 
doubted the collect ive nature of many of the 
Mediterranean pol lutants; they fe l t  that most of 
the pollut ion was caused by the ex te rna l i t ies  o f the 
industrial development o f the DCs and thought that
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the DCs were trying to portray the pol lut ion as 
being a public bad so as to promote mutual 
sacrifices by all of the l i t to ra l  states in cleaning 
the sea and thus make the LDCs pay for pol lut ion 
that they themselves were not responsible for.
The LDCs also in terpre ted  e f fo r ts  to control 
marine pollut ion as ind irect ways of retarding the ir  
attempts at industria l ization. They fe l t  that 
environmental concern would “ reproduce the 
h istor ical m ate r ia l is t  patterns of po l i t ica l  and 
economic dependency on the North which they had 
been seeking to reve rse .” ’ ^
Yet another obstacle that stands in the way of 
implementing agreements is that of disagreement 
between leaders about the need for immediate 
action. Haas states that:
Collective decision making was inhibited 
by the large degree of uncertainty about 
pollution. As the causes and e f fects  of 
pollution are too uncertain to apply to 
computer modeling or conventional 
heuristic policy approaches,
demonstrating the e f fects  of putat ive 
pollution problems can be proved to 
everyone’s satisfact ion only by
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‘pcrforin ing the expe r im en t ’ on the real 
(natural) system.'^
The uncertainty o f reciprocat ion deems 
countries somewhat hesistant to cooperate, which 
in turn, stands as yet another obstacle to 
implementing agreements. Countries share a fear of 
being taken for a ‘patsy. ’ Kenneth Waltz maintains 
that;
With a large number of actors whose 
ac t iv i t ies  need to be coordinated, the 
monitoring of national compliance is 
d i f f icu l t ,  where none can be excluded 
from enjoying the benefi ts  of o the rs ’ 
unreciprocated po l lu t ion  control e f fo r ts ,  
co llect ive action is deemed extremely 
unlikely.'^
One last obstacle to the ful l  implementation of 
agreements arises from the trad i t iona l enmity 
between the Med iterrane an countries. Polit ical 
antipathies exacerbated the problem of managing 
such a co l lect ive good as regional pollution. Such 
enmity leads to suspicion o f one another. Turkish 
naval ships challenged a Greek vessel in 1983 and 
forced the vessel to leave Turkish waters, 
therefore the Turks suspected that the Greeks 
were mapping the continental shelf as well as
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monitoring surface ool lut ion. States subordinate 
environmental concerns to the defense of
conventional oowers. as seen in the Greek-Turkish 
example.
The next section will  look into UNEP’s 
attempts at overcoming problems such as those 
studied above and look into the prospects for 
applying the same procedures in dealing with other 
international environmental problems.
Overcoming the problems in the Mediterranean 
Action Plan can mostly be accredited to the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). This 
section will  study what exact ly  UNEP’s alms were 
and i ts  e f fo r ts  at overcoming the problems 
standing in the way to regional cooperation.
UNEP was interested in control l ing a broad 
range of pol lutants and sources as well as 
incorporating environmental considerations into 
national economic planning. However, UNEP 
deliberately chose a ‘modera te ’ program instead of 
a ‘h igh-qua l i ty ’ program so as to ensure LDC 
participation. UNEP’s long term goal was to design 
a program for the Mediterranean to achieve 
e ff ic ien t management of the i r  coastal resources on 
a sustainable basis.
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UNEP’s leadership believed that:
Rather than addressing only the
problems which appear to be 
consequences of poor resource
management and environmentally
inappropriate development practices, 
the key to successful protect ion of and 
development within an ecosystem lies in 
proper and sustainable resource
management and careful application of 
development practices which are 
consistent with the health of the 
env lronment.2'^
UNEP supported e f fo r ts  to standardize 
methodologies for controll ing the pollut ion of the 
marine environment. By doing this, they hoped to 
generate results that would prove compelling to 
the Mediterranean governments about the full 
extent of pollut ion and its var ie ty  of sources and 
channels. They believed that by interesting states 
in controll ing some sources of marine pollution, 
they would be able to s teer  the Mediterranean 
countries down a 's lippery s lope’ to:
... controll ing land-based sources, more 
specific pollutants, and r iverine and 
atmospheric transport, and u lt imate ly  to
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inculcate leaders and planners with a new 
pattern of thought about integrated 
economic development.2!
UNEP hoped to lead the Mediterranean region 
to an overall reassessment of coastal land use 
practices by f i rs t ly  developing a concern with the 
pollut ion of the marine environment. By doing this 
they hoped to give rise to a “ concurrent 
considerat ion of ecological, demographic, social, 
cultural and economic forces operating in the 
l i t to ra l  zone and of their  role in shaping aggregate 
demand for uses of the Mediterranean . ” 22 Their 
ult imate goal was to promote a very sophisticated 
le arn ing.
UNEP’s leadership consisted of members of an 
epistemic community. This epistemic community 
shared an abiding be l ie f  in ecological principles 
and were committed to preserving the physical 
environment, which they thought was threatened by 
pollution.
UNEP’s epistemic community formed 
transnational alliances with the regional marine 
scientists and non governmental organizations that 
held similar views. Stjepen Keckes expressed the 
importance of Including domestic sc ient is ts  in the 
Med Plan as follows: "you don’t have to wait until
73
the infrastructure is wen-developed to use it. You 
have to make the infrastructure grow through the 
program. ”23
The truth of the matter  was that even though 
these scientis ts and inst itut ions did not wholely 
share UNEP’s ideology, they nevertheless 
part ic ipated because they saw that there were 
advantages to doing so. Foreign policy off ic ials 
part ic ipated because they hoped to achieve their  
environmental foreign policy goals and the
scientis ts participated because they hoped for 
research support. Countries that were originally 
opposed to negotiating were persuaded to do so 
through rewards of laboratories, funding, training, 
and prestige. Although these rewards were not 
large enough to overcome all opposition, they were 
nevertheless successful in guaranteeing continued 
attendance at Med Plan meetings. Many LDCs, such 
as Egypt and Algeria came to support the Med Plan, 
not because they shared UNEP’s ideology, but 
rather because they benefited materia l ly from 
part ic ipation in Med Plan projects. UNEP was 
successfully able to wed these Interests in a broad 
enough program that sat isf ied everyone’s short­
term interests, while at the same time promoting a 
more al l- inclusive program (52).
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The regional scientists and non governmental 
organizations provided advice to the ir  own 
governments that were consistent with the 
interests of UNEP. At the national level, these 
scient is ts demonstrated the need for a broader 
international agenda, and encouraged their  own 
governments to develop pollut ion control 
measures. UNEP used information that was accepted 
by all o f  the regional scientists and was thus able 
to demonstrate the need for treating a wider range 
of pol lutants and sources of moving toward a more 
comprehensive focus.
Together, UNEP and the reg ional sc ient is ts-g®^ 
led the way for governments to accept a broader 
international agenda and to support more 
comprehensive domestic policies. This 
international level ac t iv i ty  alerted governments to 
the need for developing fam il ia r i ty  with problems 
facing them at home.
It was through the use of pol i t ica l compromise 
and technical consensus that UNEP was able to 
promote a comprehensive program for pollut ion 
control. It was th is po l i t ica l  compromise and 
technical consensus that laid the groundwork for:
marine scient is ts to gain access to
decision making within their  countr ies
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rind u lt im ate ly  guide domestic decision 
making toward convergent, broader 
policies region wide. Once in posit ion 
with the ir  own governments, they urged 
compliance with the Med Plan and pushed 
their governments to adopt and enforce 
more comprehensive pollut ion contro l 
policies.2“^
Again, it was po l i t ica l  compromise that kept 
all the part ies involved in the negotiations. And, it 
was through the negotiat ions process that new 
groups were introduced to national decision 
making. These new groups succeeded in redefining 
the national In terest,  so that states, part icular ly  
the weaker ones, came to support the
Mediterranean Action Plan, despite strong 
structura l incentives to cease their  collaboration.
UNEP adopted the princip le of ‘geographic 
d is t r ib u t io n ’ so as to reward countries for 
part ic ipating in the Med Plan. It also encouraged 
technical self-rel iance. By doing this, UNEP was 
able to d is tr ibute  Med Plan benefi ts  throughout the 
reg ion.
The principle of geographical d is t r ibu t ion  
aimed to avoid the unequal d is t r ibu t ion  of gains 
from part ic ipat ion in the Med Plan. Through this
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principle, the LDCg actually gained more from 
participating in the Med Plan than did the DCs.
All parties to the Med Plan were assigned 
responsibi l i t ies in the pollution control program. 
Regional Act iv i ty  Centers () were established so as 
to both assist UNEP and coordinate projects of the 
Med Plan Coordinated Pollution Monitoring and 
Research Program (Med Pol). Each project was given 
to an institution in a Mediterranean country to 
supervise.
RACs were established in France, Yugoslavia, 
Tunisia, Malta and Greece. Spain was made the 
temporary legal depository until the Athens office 
was established. The RACs were equitably 
distributed; France was given the Blue Plan, 
Yugoslavia was given the Priority Actions 
Programme (PAP), Tunisia.was given the Specially 
Protected Areas (SPA) office, Greece was given the 
headquarters unit, Malta received the Regional Oil 
Spill Combating Center (ROCC), and Spain was made 
the legal repository for regional agreements.
Laboratories for monitoring and research were 
set up in Algeria, Egypt, France, Italy, Malta, 
Turkey and Yugoslavia. These were also distributed 
equitably around the basin: two for the core, two 
for the periphery and two for the semiperiphery.
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UNEP took care to d is t r ibu te  the benefits equally 
so as to reinforce domestic se lf -re l iance in 
scienti f ic  matters  in the LOGS. Through UNEP and 
the Med Plan, these LDC ins t i tu t ions received 
research funding and new equipment, and were 
provided with maintenance and training in its use. 
Those that did not continuously attend the Med Plan 
meetings did not receive any tangible rewards. 
Libya and Syria for example did not receive any 
benefits from the Med Plan due to the ir  infrequent 
attendance. Countries also gained po l i t ica l ly  from 
part icipating in the Med Plan. Israel, for example, 
did not receive any d irec t  benefits from the Med 
Plan, but was nevertheless able to part ic ipate in a 
forum with Arab states and gain some legitimacy in 
international discussions through its involvement 
in the Med P l a n . 25
In addit ion to forming a coal i t ion with national 
scientists, UNEP sought to reach out d irect ly  to the 
public of the Mediterranean by publicizing the 
program whenever possible. In this respect, the 
Geneva UNEP s ta f f  included a fu l l - t im e  public 
relations o f f ice r  who was to promote the program 
to the media and develop close contacts with 
national non governmental organizations.
Through the principle of geographical 
d istr ibut ion, UNEP was able to t rea t  all
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participants equally and thus come to serve as a 
buffer between the North and the South. Realizing 
that they reaped equal if not superior benefits to 
the DCs, the LDC off ic ia ls  came to respect UNEP’s 
unbiased position; thus UNEP’s documentation was 
“ generally accepted as a u th o r i ta t ive .’’2^
The Mediterranean Action Plan succeeded in 
bringing countries of diverse backgrounds and 
interests to the negotiat ions table to discuss their  
common problem and seek for solutions. Peter M. 
Haas and Julie Zuckman repo r t  in Oceanus (volume 
33, Number 1 Spring 1990) that “ the quality of 
Mediterranean seawater has in some respects 
improved during the last fe w y e a rs ’’ and that;
... pollut ion levels have stabil ized and are 
now about the same as those recorded in 
the early 1970s. This is a s ignif icant 
accomplishment when one considers the 
rapid growth in coastal population and 
industr ia l ization during the last 20 
years. Thus, a sea once headed for 
ext inct ion is s t i l l  diseased, but not 
terminally i l l .27
The c red it  for th is success largely belongs to 
UNEP and the Mediterranean Action Plan that it
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devised to overcome the pol lut ion of the marine 
environment in the region.
UNEP’s e f fo r ts  at overcoming the obstacles 
barring international cooperation were studied in 
this chapter. Chapter Two had looked into the 
advantages of transnational all iances between 
UNEP’s epistemlc community and regional marine 
scientists. It was the national sc ient is ts  that 
enlightened the ir  governments in matters  of 
pollut ion and persuaded them of the importance of 
accepting the goal of environmental pro tect ion, 
and thus led the way to cooperation.
A recipe for success in international 
environmental cooperation can then be formulated 
from Chapter Two and the present chapter.
Epistemic communities may well, prove 
inf luential in other International environmental 
issues. Likewise, a system of rewards and sanctions 
will  most probably encourage governments to 
part ic ipate in cooperation negotiat ions regardless 
of the ir  d ivergent national interests. The principle 
of geographic d is t r ibu t ion  will  make states more 
will ing to cooperate as i t  w i l l  ensure them that 
they will  all gain equally. Assigning each state with 
respons ib i l i t ies  of the ir  own, such as RACs or 
laboratories for research and monitor ing, w i l l
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reinforce the power of the state and eliminate 
fears of recursions on state sovereignty. One o ther 
factor which would open the way to cooperation 
would be publicizing problems, injecting the public 
with pollut ion awareness and thus leading the way 
for them to put pressure on the ir  governments to 
look for solutions.
True, the above recipe is not easy to carry 
out. But, neither is i t  Impossible. The 
Mediterranean countries succeeded in coming 
together to save their  common sea. The
Mediterranean is not and probably never will  be 
pristine, but i t  would have been headed for  
ext inct ion had i t  not been for the Med Plan.
This chapter had also looked into factors 
posing as obstacles in the. way of international 
environmental cooperation and they were many, The 
same obstacles would more or less apply to other 
cases of international environmental problems. 
And, i f  they were overcome in the Med Plan case, 
there stands no reason for them not to be 
overcome in other cases of environmental issues. 
What’s more is that they need to be overcome so as 
to make the world a b e t te r  place to live in, both 
for us and for future generations.
81
N O T E S
Chapter I:
1. Michel Grenon and Michel Bâtisse, eds., Mavi Plan: 
Akdeniz Havzasının Geleceği (PNUE - CAP/PB 1 988), 
3 .
2. Peter Xavier, ed., The Mediterranean (London, 
Collins and Brown Ltd., 1991), 1 1 1.
3. Peter M. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean: The 
Polit ics of International Environmental Cooperation 
(NewYork: Colombia University Press, 1990), 33.
CHAPTER
1. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 33.
2. Robert 0. Keohane, A f te r  Heaemonv: Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Poli t ical Economy 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 
51-52.
3. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 34.
82
4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Po l i t ics  
(Reading, Mass.; Addison - Wesley, 1979), 196-199.
5. Haas, Savina the Med iterranean. 37.
6. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 38.
7. Waltz. Theory. 196-199.
8. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 38.
9. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 39.
10. Waltz, Theo rv . 209.
1 1. Waltz, Theory. 209-210.
12. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 40.
13. Keohane, A f te r  Hegemony . 32.
1 4. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 40.
15. Duncan Snidal, “ The Limits of Hegemonic 
Stab i l i ty  Theory,” International Organization (39:4 
Autumn 1 985) 596.
16. Keohane, A f te r  Hegemony. 32.
83
17. Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World 
Polit ics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), 228.
18. Gilpin. War and Change. 229-234.
19. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 43.
20. Keohane, A f te r  Hegemony . 32.
21. Robert 0. Keohane, Neorealism and its Crit ics 
(New York; Colombia University Press, 1986), 12- 
13.
22. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 44.
23. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 44-46.
24. Immanuel Wallenstein, The Capita l ist World 
Economy (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
1979), 136-140.
25. Wallenstein. World Economy. 137.
26. Johan Galtung, “ The L im its to Growth and Class 
P o l i t ics ” Journal of Peace Research (10: 1973), 1 13.
84
27. B. Sutcl i ffe, '‘ Imperialism and Industr ia l izat ion 
in the Third World,” in Studies in the Theory of 
Imperial ism. R. Owen and B. Sutcl i f fe, eds., (London, 
Longman, 1972), 172.
28. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 49.
29. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 52.
30. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 53.
31. Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univers i ty  Press, 1983), 
185.
32. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 55.
33. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 82.
34. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 1 23.
35. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 224.
36. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 225.
37. Gulgun Tuna, “ International Environmental
Cooperation: Retrospect and Prospect,”
unpublished essay (Ankara: Bilkent University, 
1995), 6.
85
38. Tuna, “ Retrospect and Prospect,” 6.
39. Tuna, "Retrospect and Prospect,” 7.
40. Tuna, “Retrospect and Prospect,” 8.
41. Tuna, “ Retrospect and Prospect,” 8.
42. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 33.
43. Tuna, “ Retrospect and Prospect,” 8.
CHAPTER III;
1. UNEP, Mediterranean Action Plan and Convention 
for the Protection of the Med iterranean Sea against 
Pollution and related protocols (Athens, 1992), 1 1- 
12.
2. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, AMBIO (6:6, 
1977) 310.
3. Gregorios J. Timagenis, International Control of 
Marine Pollution (New York; Oceana Publications, 
Inc., 1980), 24.
86
4. Timagenis, Marine Po Hut ion. 25.
5. Timagenis, Marine Po Hut ion. 28.
5. UNEP, The Mediterranean Action Plan: Savina Our 
Common Heritage (Athens), 8.
7. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 29.
8. UNEP, Common Heritage. 8.
9. Timagenis, Marine Po Hut ion. 27.
10. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean. 35-39.
I 1. UNEP, Common Her i tage. 9.
12. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 29.
13. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 28.
14. UNEP, Common Heritage . 8.
15. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 29.
16. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 30.
17. UNEP, Common Her i tage. 9.
87
18. WHO and UNEP Wa<=;te Discharge into the Marine
Environment (New York: Pergamon Press Ltd.,
1982), 2.
19. UNEP, Common Heritage . 9.
20. WHO and UNEP, Waste Discharge. 2.
2 1. WHO and UNEP, Waste Discharge. 2.
22. UNEP, Common Her i tage . 8.
23. UNEP, Common H er i tage . 12.
24. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 66-67.
25. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 82.
26. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 86.
27. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 8-9.
28. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 83.
29. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 66.
30. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 83.
3 1. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 87.
88
32. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, AMBIO. 
310.
33. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean. 89.
34. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 9 1.
35. S.H. Jenkins, ed., Mediterranean Coastal 
Pol lut ion. (New York: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1980), 4.
36. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 92.
37. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 93.
38. Jenkins. Coastal Po l lu t ion . 11.
39. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, AMBIQ. 
312.
40. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 97.
41. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 97.
42. Jenkins, Coastal Po l lu t ion . 5.
43. UNEP, Convention. 1 1.
89
44. UNEP, Med iterranean Action Plan. (France, 
September 1985), 15.
45. UNEP, Convention. 12-13.
45. UNEP, Convention. 1 3.
47. UNEP, Action Plan. 1 5.
48. UNEP, Convention. 25.
49. UNEP, Convention. 28.
50. UNEP, Convention. 28.
51. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 1 08.
52. UNEP, Convention. 34.
53. Jenkins, Coastal Po l lu t ion. 5.
54. Jenkins, Coastal Po l lu t ion. 5-7.
55. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean.
55. UNEP, Convention. 41.
57. Haas, S a v in a  the  M e d i t e r r a n e a n . 1 10.
90
58. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean, i 17.
59. UNEP, Convention. 53.
50. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 1 18.
51. Peter S. Thacher, "The Stockholm Process,” The 
Siren. (20: May 1983), 2.
52. Jenkins, Coastal Po l lu t ion . 1 1.
53. UNEP, A Blue Plan for the Mediterranean People 
(UNEP, France, 1993), 3.
54. Jenkins. Coastal Po l lu t ion . 11.
55. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, AMBIO. 
333-334.
55. UNEP, A Blue Plan. 3.
57. UNEP, Action Plan. 1 4.
58. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 1 23- 125.
59. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 1 25.
70. Haas, S a v in a  the  M e d i t e r r a n e a n . 1 25.
91
71. Haas, S a v in g  the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . 1 25.
72. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 1 25.
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION;
. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 27.
2. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean. J9-40.
5. Haas. Savina the Mediterranean. 166-167.
4. Haas, Savina the Med iterrane an. 44.
5. Haas, Savina the Med iterrane an. 39.
6. Haas, Savina the Med iterrane an. 69-70.
7. Haas, Savina the Med iterrane an. 39.
8. Haas, Savina the Med iterrane an.
9. Haas, Savina the Med i terranean. 209.
0. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 207.
1. Haas, S a v in a  the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . 1 9
92
M r i r i n  M r v H i f r v r ' n o n A n r s  1 T 1
I I Ci  C4 O  ,  * > V C i V  l t > M  C l I V ^  I I C 4 l t ^ O H i  ^ 1 ^ 1 .
13. Haas, Saving the f ied l te rrancan . 1 c ;-7\ ^  t .
14. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 208.
15. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean. 85.
16. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 1 90- 19
17. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. T 1 ^ I
18. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 39.
19. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 36.
20. Thacher, "Stockholm Process,” 2.
2 . Haas, Saving the Mediterranean. 77.
22. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 77
23. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, AM8iO. 
310.
24. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 78-79
25. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 1 89- 199.
93
26. Haas, Savina the Mediterranean. 8 1 -82.
27. Peter M. Haas and Julie Zuckman, “The Med is
Cleaner,” Oceanus (33:1, Spring 1990), 40-42.
94
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
1. E İs ter. Jon. Explaining Technical Change. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
2. Galtung, Johan. “The Limits to Growth and Class 
Pol i t ics .” Journal of Peace Research. 10 ( 1973) 1 13.
3. Gibson, J. Euguene and Faith Halter 
“ Strengthening Environmental Law in Developing 
Countries.” Env ironment (Jan/Feb 1 994) 40-43.
4. Gilpin, Robert G. War and Change in World 
Polit ics. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
1981.
5. G re non, Michel and Bâtisse, M ichel eds.. Mavi Plan: 
Akdeniz Havzasının Geleceği. PNUE - CAP/PB 1988.
6. Haas, Peter M. and Zuckman, Julie. Qceanus. 33:1 
(Spring 1 990) 40-42.
7. Haas Peter M. Saving the Med iterranean: The
Pol i t ics____ o_f____ International_____Environmental
Cooperation. New York; Colombia University Press, 
1990.
95
8. Hanson, David. “ Globa! Cooperation Key to Saving 
Environment." Chemical and Engineering News. 
(September 9, 1991) 23,
9. Hileman, Bette. “ Earth Summit Co mC ludes with 
Agenda for Action, But L i t t le  Funding." Chemical 
and Engineering News. (July 6, 1992) 7- 1 7.
10. Je f t ie ,  L.J. and Saliba L.J. “The Mediterranean 
Action Plan: A Regional Approach to Pollution 
Control." yyater Science Technology, 18 (19861
o A c :
r ^ O  f Z \  1-n 7 I  ^/
1 1. Jenkins, S.H., ed. Mediterranean Coastal 
Pollution. New York:Pergamon Press Ltd., 1 980.
12. Keohane, Robert 0. A f te r  Heoemonv:
Cooperation and Discord in the World Polit ical 
Eco no mv. Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University 
Pre ss, 1 984.
13. Keohane, Robert 0. Neorealism and its Crit ics. 
New York; Colombia University Press, 1986.
14. Lepkowski, Wil. “Macroeconomic Policies 
Blamed for Developing Nations’ Ecological Decline." 
Chemical and Engineering News. (September 14, 
1992) 26.
96
15. Luke, Anthony. “ Talks Sink Plans to Clean u d  
Mediterranean.” New Scientist. 128 (November 3, 
1990) 22.
15. Pastor, Xavier, ed. The Mediterranean. London: 
Collins and Brown Ltd., 1991.
17. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. AM BIO. 6:5 
(1977) 299-378.
18. Rose, Julian. “ Environmental Investment in the 
Med iterranean. ” Environmental Science and 
Technology. 27:8. (1993). 1494.
19. Snidal, Duncan. “ The Limits of Hegemonic 
Stabi l i ty  Theory.” International Organization. 39:4 
(Autumn 1 985) 596.
20. Sutcli ffe, B. “ Imperialism and Industr ialization 
in the Third World.” In R. Owen and B. Sutcli ffe, eds.. 
Studies in the theory o f Imperialism. Londoh: 
Longman, 1972.
21. Thacher, Peter S. “The Stockholm Process.” The 
Siren 20 (May 1 983) 2.
22. Timagenis, Gregorios J. International Control of 
Marine Pollution. New York: Oceana Publications, 
Inc., 1 980.
97
2 j ·. Tuna, GulgOn. “ I n t e r n a t i o n a !  E n v i r o n m e n t a l
Cooperation; Retrospect 
Unpublished paper.
and Prosoect.”
24. UNEP, “Mediterranean 
Mediterranean Co-ordinating
Action Plan.” 
Unit, France,
Q ^  f  o  no K ^  n  1 O  Q
25. UNEP, “The Mediterranean Action Plan in. a 
functional perspective; A quest for law and po l icy .” 
MAP Technical Reports Series No;25. UNEP, Athens,
1988.
26. UNEP, “ Implications of expected climate 
changes in the Mediterranean Region; An Overv ie'w. ” 
MAP Technical Reports Series No. 27. UNEP, Athens,
1989.
27. UNEP, “ State of the Mediterranean marine 
env ironment.” MAP Technical Reports Series No. 29. 
UNEP, Athens, 1 989.
28. UNEP, “ Integrated Planning and Management of 
the Mediterranean Coastal Zones.” MAP Technical 
Reports Series No. 61. UNEP, Pr ior i ty  Actions 
Programme, Regional A c t iv i t y  Center, Split , 199 1.
98
29. UNEP, “Mediterranean Act ion Plan and 
Convention for the Protect ion of the Mediterranean 
Sea against Pollution and i ts  related pro tocols .” 
UNEP, Athens, 1 992.
30. UNEP, “ A Blue Plan for the Mediterranean 
People.” UNEP, France, 1993.
31. UNEP, “ Report of the Eighth Ordinary Meeting of 
the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the 
protect ion of the Mediterranean Sea against 
Pollution and its related p ro toco ls . ” UNEP, Athens,
1993.
32. UNEP, “ The Mediterranean Action Plan: Saving 
our common her itage.” UNEP.
33. UNEP, Med Waves. 29. (Winter 1993-1994) 1 -22.
34. UNEP, Med Waves. 30 (Autumn 1 994) 1-23.
35. UNEP, Med Waves. 3 1. (Winter 1994-1995) 1-12.
36. UNEP, “ Final Act and Pro toco l. ” UNEP, Athens,
1994.
37. Wallenstein, Immanuel. The Capitalist World 
Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979.
99
38. Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International 
Poli t ics. Read ing, Mass.; Addison - Wesley. 1979.
39. World Bank. Investing in the Mediterranean 
Env ironment. EIB. April 1993.
40. World Bank and the European Investment Bank. 
The Environmental Program for the Mediterranean. 
World Bank and EIB, 1990.
41. WHO and UNEP. Waste Discharge into the Marine 
Env ironment. NewYork: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1 982.
100
